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The present research aims to highlight the importance of the external auditing in supporting 
corporate governance and the preference of the listed entities to be audited by the big audit 
companies. Given the proposed objectives of the research, our scientific method is based on a 
deductive  approach  from  general  to  particular  that  combines  quantitative  and  qualitative 
studies. The role of the external audit was analyzed by conducting a study of literature on two 
levels: a theoretical–conceptual level in terms of economic theories and an empirical-practical 
level  based  on  literature  from  which  we  extracted  through  a  content  analysis  the  defining 
elements  of  the  audit  work  quality. Falling  within  the  scope  of  the  study,  we  evaluated  the 
preference of the listed entities to be audited by the Big Four. To this end we used the content 
analysis of the publicly posted audit reports for the period 2005-2009. Our research results show 
that although we are a country with an emerging capital market development, the entities in the 
I-st category on the Bucharest Stock Exchange tend to an audit conducted by one of the big audit 
companies. Another result arising from our study is that the entities of the I-st category on the 
Bucharest Stock Exchange become more transparent from a year to another. Whether for the 
year 2005 we find only 12 audit reports publicly posted, in 2007 we can find 21 audit reports 
publicly posted. The trend of the large entities audited shows that the preference of the entities to 
be audited by one of the Big Four is higher from a year to another. The preparation of the 
financial statements and their audit must be done according to regulations for the currently 
period. The presumption found in the literature according to which the large entities are audited 
by the big audit companies which provide higher audit quality is confirmed in the case of our 
national country as well. 
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1.Introduction 
One of the prevalent ideas in the literature supports the preference of the large entities to be 
audited by the big audit firms, and the most common argument to support this preference is the 
quality of their audit services (Moizer 1997, Francis 2004, and Barton 2005). ￿
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Starting from this hypothesis we wanted to study its validity on the Romanian capital market and 
we studied whether this preference also applies to the entities listed on the I-st category of the 
BSE, knowing the fact that Romania is an emerging country and its market capital is being 
developed. According to the analysis we can conclude that Romanian entities listed on the BSE 
follow the same preference as the companies listed on international markets. 
In the Regulation no.1/2006 regarding the issuers and securities transactions the art.b227-(1) states 
that the companies admitted to trading on a regulated market will prepare, will make available to 
the public and send to CNVM and to the market operator their quarterly, biannual and annual 
financial reports accompanied by the full comments (Regulation no.1/2006, Title IV, Chapter III). 
The  auditor's  report  deals  with  both  the  consolidated  and  individual  financial  statements. The 
annual report is made publicly available in writing, on request, and in electronic form on the 
website of the issuer. Annual reports remain available to the public at least for five years. 
The  paper  is  structured  in  three  sections. In  the  first  section  is  presented  the  actual  stage  of 
knowledge regarding the role of the external audit. This objective is achieved through a theoretical 
and conceptual approach on the role of audit, followed by a practical and empirical approach. In 
this approach we focused our attention on the quality of the services offered by the audit firms. In 
the second section we made a case study on the entities pertaining to the I-st category of BSE, 
through which we want to reflect the preference of the large entities to be audited by a big audit 
company. The third section of the paper contains the conclusions of our study.  
 
2. Research methodology 
Our study refers to the listed entities as they are prone to voluntarily apply the Code of Corporate 
Governance and thus the audit requirements regarding the transparency of the financial and non-
financial statements. We analyzed only the audit reports of the individual financial statements as 
they can be found on the Bucharest Stock Exchange in greater numbers than those consolidated. 
We analyzed the reports from 2005 to 2009, because only for this period we could find the 
complete  information  posted  on  the  CNVM  in  order  to  compare  it  with  data  found  on  the 
websites of companies or on the BSE website. 
In order to conduct the case study we used a deductive approach, through a content analysis of 
the  audit  reports  publicly  posted  on  the  website  of  the  Stock  Exchange,  National  Securities 
Commission  or  on  the  entity’s  website. To  reach  that  goal  we  followed  the  next  steps:  we 
analyzed  the  regulations  concerning  the  preparation  of  the  audit  reports  and  the  financial 
statements, we selected the necessary dates from the audit reports, and we selected the entities to 
be analyzed. Then we collected the information, we defined the analysis methodology, we made 
the proper analysis and, at the end, we interpreted the obtained results. The data analysis was 
made with the statistical program SPSS 16.  
 
3.  Actual  stage  of  knowledge  regarding  the  role  of  the  external  audit  in  corporate 
governance  
Theoretical and conceptual approach 
External audit has an undeniable role when stakeholders or interested third parties may trust the 
financial information provided by an entity. The auditor is the specialist that, through his opinion, 
confirms the fidelity/accuracy/reality of the financial statements, as they are legally able to verify 
such  data. When  the  audit  report  contains  an  unqualified  opinion,  the  users  of  the  financial 
statements offer a deeply trust in the accuracy of the financial information.  
Motivational theory 
The motivational theory explains the audit process through a superior qualitative professional 
judgment of those who bear responsibility for the preparation and presentation of the financial 
statements to be audited (Dobro￿eanu and Dobro￿eanu  2002, Ball 2003, Woodbine and Gordon ￿
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2010). Moreover, the motivational theory considers that the audit process must be performed by 
the  best  prepared  professionals  which  occupy  the  superior  level  position  including  the 
responsibility for expressing their opinions. 
Agency theory 
Agency  theory  developed  by  Berle  and  Means  (1932)  leads  to  the  dissociation  of  the 
administration and control department. As stated Jenes and Meckling (1976) the principal which 
is  not  a  shareholder  is  interested  on  his  personal  benefits  and  not  on  the  interests  of  the 
shareholders. Thus, "the company is a legal fiction which serves as a focal point for a complex 
process  in  which  conflicts  between  individuals  are  resolved  by  implementing  a  network  of 
contractual relationship" (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Insurance theory 
Insurance theory is based on two principles: the principle of ensuring according to which the 
audited information has a certain degree of assurance and the principle of information according 
to  which  the  investors,  managers  have  greater  confidence  in  the  audited  information  when 
making their decision. The importance of the financial audit explained by the theory of insurance, 
reduce  the  risk  of  presenting  incorrect  information. Information  risk  differs  from  the  risk  of 
business bankruptcy, although the information was properly presented. Business risk may occur 
as a result of events that cannot be anticipated. 
Using financial statements may incur loss due to misstatements. The probability of recovery the 
loss becomes higher when the company has an auditor and is directly proportional to the size and 
reputation of the auditor. Important auditors, so-called "deep pockets" assure investors against the 
consequences of inaccurate financial statements (Simunic and Stein, 1995). 
Theory of interested parties (stakeholders) 
Individualistic  approach  of  the  economic,  financial  and  political  interdependences  from 
nowadays when speaking of globalization, no longer finds relevance, so far the model becomes 
complex  and  the  theory  of  stakeholders  (theory)  meets  the  information  needs  of  all  the 
stakeholders. 
Stakeholder theory has gained momentum in 1970, but in 1984 was conducted the first research 
on stakeholder theory in management. Generally, the theory can be applied to all of the entities, 
while  the  management  of  the  entities  is  required  to  provide  information  to  all  the 
stakeholders. The theory was also developed in other disciplines (Donaldson and Preston, 1995), 
given the role of the entities on the capital market which becomes increasingly important.  
 
Practical and empirical approach 
A number of researchers which examined the role of the external audit in corporate governance 
have focused on the study of the audit quality. From the 19th century, many countries have tried 
to improve the audit quality through regulation, laws or by creating rules regarding the auditor’s 
independence, or regarding the public oversight. All such modifications and improvements have 
helped to improve the audit quality (Baker et. al., 2010). Some of them consider that audit quality 
can be measured by the risk reduction, by the reputation of the auditors (Brian et al., 2007, 
Lennox  1999)  and  others  through  the  power  and  independence  of  auditors (Knechel  2000, 
Herrbach 2001, Lowensohn et al. 2007, Watkins et al., 2004). 
Authors such as Moizer (1997), Francis (2004) and Barton (2005) analyzed the quality of the 
audit and concluded that the quality of the audit service is immeasurable. Thus it remains the 
duty of auditors to add credibility to the corporate financial reports through their examination and 
expressing  of a  true  and correct  opinion  as required  in  IAPS  1004. The  financial statements 
auditing provides confidence when the users are satisfied with the results of the process. 
Francis (2004) supports the idea that audits conducted by one of the Big Four are of a higher 
quality than those made by an individual auditor. He made an empirical research analysis over ￿
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the past 25 years, especially in the United States, to assess the knowledge regarding the audit 
quality of the listed companies. His conclusions showed that the audit failure rate is low, much 
less of 1% per year, while the audit fees are quite small, less than 0.1% of the global sales of the 
customers.All these results show that the audit acceptable level of quality is achieved at low cost. 
Another finding of the mentioned study shows that the low quality audits in 1990 had a major 
contribution to the onset of the financial failures, and implicitly as a measure against them, the 
initiation of recent reforms, such as the elaboration of Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 in the U.S. Even 
though there have developed a series of laws and recommendations, the literature does not define 
an optimal level of audit quality, so it cannot be answered the question whether the level of audit 
quality is "too low" or "too high”.  
We can conclude that it is difficult to determine an optimal level of audit quality, but we also 
support the idea found in the literature that the audit conducted by one of the biggest firms is 
higher qualitatively than the audit performed by an individual auditor. 
Lennox (1999) considers that the big audit firms are more stringent than the small firms. To 
demonstrate  this  statement  he  makes  two  assumptions: Hypothesis  1:  reputation  hypothesis 
according to which the big auditors have a greater interest in providing high quality services as 
they don’t want to lose their reputation (DeAngelo, 1981) and Hypothesis 2: "deep pockets" 
hypothesis which mentions that big auditors should be more rigorous, because they have greater 
experience on the entities with litigation risk. The results show preference on the "deep pockets" 
hypothesis than on the reputation hypothesis as regards the size of the auditor and the litigation 
risk. 
 
4. Study regarding the preference of the entities to be audited by one of the Big Four 
Through this study we want to test if the hypothesis regarding the big entities’ preference to be 
audited by the big audit companies is confirmed, taking into account that Romania is a country 
with an emerging capital market development. 
The table below presents an overview of the number of companies audited by the Big Four and 
those audited by the other audit firms. 
Tab.1. The number of companies audited by the audit companies 
  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
    Frequency  Percent  Frequency  Percent  Frequency  Percent  Frequency  Percent  Frequency  Percent 
Valid  DELOITTE  3  14.3  4  19.0  5  23.8  5  23.8  4  19.0 
KPMG      4  19.0  4  19.0  4  19.0  6  28.6 
ERNST & YOUNG  3  14.3  3  14.3  2  9.5  2  9.5  2  9.5 
PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPERS  0  0  1  4.8  2  9.5  2  9.5  2  9.5 
OTHER  6  28.6  7  33.3  8  31.8  8  38.1  7  33.3 
Total  12  57.1  19  90.5  21  100  21  100  21  100 
  Missing System  9    2  9.5  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Total    21  100  21  100  21  100  21  100  21  100 
Source: projection made by the author 
Analysis results 
a.General trend of the publication of audit reports 
As can be seen in the table above, from a year to another, the numbers of entities that publicly 
post their audit report increases. In 2005 from 21 entities considered in our analysis only 12 of 
them publicly posted their audit reports. Later, in 2009, there are 21 entities which made public 
their audit reports. We also note that in 2005 there were 20 entities listed on the stock market. 
The constant increase of the entities that have publicly posted their audit reports and financial 
statements is a good thing. We consider that the publication of the audit reports and financial 
statements is a relevant indicator of effective corporate governance. Transparency of the financial ￿
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statements and audit reports due to their electronic publication and the unfettered public access 
represents the premises of effective corporate governance. 
b.The number of entities audited by one of the Big Four  
From the above analysis it can be seen the upward trend of the entities audited by one of the Big 
Four. The explanation of this trend refers to the fact that these companies perform high level of 
analysis when auditing the financial statements and their knowledge regarding the international 
accounting and auditing standards is superior. 
In 2005 from the 12 entities that have publicly posted their audit report on the website of the 
BSE, CNVM or on its own website, six of the entities were audited by one of the Big Four audit 
company. One year later, in December 2006 there are already 12 entities audited by one of the 
Big  Four  of  a  total  of 19  entities  on the  Bucharest  Stock  Exchange  that  had  their  financial 
statements audited.  
c.The popularity of the big audit companies 
In order to determine the popularity of the most important audit companies and their evolution 
over the last five years we have determined the annual total number of the audited entities, 
followed by the determination of the number of entities audited by one of the Big Four. In the 
figure below it can be observed the evolution of popularity of the audit firms during 2005-2009. 
 
Fig.1. The popularity of the big audit companies from 2005 to 2009 
 
   
 
Source: projection made by the authors 
 
As can be seen in the figure above, even though we are a country with an emerging capital 
market development, the entities in the I-st category of the Bucharest Stock Exchange tend to an 
audit conducted by one of the big audit companies. In 2005 half of the entities were audited by 
one of the big audit companies and the other half by the other audit entities. Moreover, in 2009 
the situation shows that from the 21 audit reports of the listed entities 66 % were audited by one 
of the Big Four. 
A first conclusion arising from our study is that the I-st category entities from the Bucharest 
Stock Exchange become more transparent from a year to another. In 2005 we find only 12 audit 
reports which were publicly posted, while in 2007 all of the 21 entities electronically published 
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A second conclusion would be the ascending trend of the entities audited by one of the Big 
Four. Also the preparation of the financial statements and their auditing is done according to the 
specific regulations of the current period. Therefore, the evolution of the qualified or unqualified 
opinion is not constant and has no different upward or downward trend from a year to another. 
The modification in the auditor's opinion may be due to the fact that auditor changes from year to 
year, and most often when the auditor changes the opinion issued could be different. 
In conclusion, the presumption found in the literature, namely: the big entities are audited by the 
big audit companies because they provide higher audit quality is also confirmed in the case of the 
Romanian emerging countries with capital market development. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we approached the external audit role in achieving effective corporate governance 
from two perspectives: a theoretical-conceptual approach in terms of an economic theory and a 
practical–empirical approach in terms of specific literature. External audit has an undeniable role 
on the trust of the stakeholders in the financial information provided by an entity. The auditor is 
responsible in the issuance of an audit opinion in order to confirm to the interested parties the 
fidelity/accuracy/reality  of  the  financial  statements.   The  preparation  and  publication  of  the 
standard audit report provides greater confidence in the entity's financial statements and reports. 
One of the common ideas in the literature supports the preference of the big entities to be audited 
by  the  most  important  audit  firms,  as  it  is  considered  the  superior  quality  of  their  audit 
services. Falling within the scope of our concerns and being strictly related to our research, we 
investigated whether this preference also applies to the I-st category entities listed on the BSE, 
knowing the fact that Romania is an emerging country and its capital market it is in a continuous 
development. At the end of the study we can conclude that Romanian entities listed on the BSE 
show the same preferences as those listed on the international markets. In addition, on the basis 
of the collected data we were able to draw several conclusions that define the audit market in 
Romania with examples on the entities listed on Bucharest Stock Exchange. 
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